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Included within the statutory definition of first degree murder is
"murder.. . in the commission of, or attempt to commit... robbery."2
Yet, on September 17, 1999, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "[a]n
instruction on first degree murder was not warranted because the video tape
clearly established that (the victim] was shot in the chest during the commis-
sion ofarmed robbery at the convenience store."3 That, of course, is precisely
first degree murder. One might think, or at least hope, that such careless
language is an anomaly among the Supreme Court of Virginia decisions.
Sadly, it reflects a continuing trend by the Supreme Court of Virginia
toward analytical looseness in capital cases. In the context of capital cases
based upon predicate felonies, it is frequent.
In the beginning there were traditional felonies. Then there was capital
murder. After robbery and rape became predicate felonies under the Vir-
ginia capital murder statute,' the definition of those traditional felonies
began to change. A similar phenomenon may be occurring with forcible
sodomy and object sexual penetration, statutory felonies that are predicates
for capital murder. More specifically, the Virginia courts have expanded the
definitions of robbery and rape in the context of capital cases. This article
will show how the definition of robbery remained the same in the non-
capital context but expanded in the capital context, thus creating two
different standards.' Secondly, this article will demonstrate how the expan-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.S.,
University of Alabama at Birmingham. Thank you to my parents for their love and suport
and to Trey and Meaghan for their friendship and inspiration. Also, thanks to Professor
Roger Groot for his guidance with this article.
2. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-32 (Michie 1999).
3. Orbe v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808, 813 (Va. 1999) (emphasis added). See
Briley v. Bass, 584 F. Supp. 807,839 (E.D. Va. 1984) (holding that "the defendant found guilty
of first degree murder is the defendant who killed during the course of a robbery, but did not
kill with willfullness, deliberation, and premeditation).
4. See VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(4) & (5) (Michie 1999).
5. See discussion infra Part II.
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sion of rape began in the capital context and then carried over to rape in the
non-capital context." Finally,,this article will discuss how the expansion of
rape in the capital context probably has been extended to cases involving
forcible sodomy and object sexual penetration and has established a danger-
ous trend for capital cases predicated upon those felonies
II. Robbery
A. Robbery and Larceny Defined
In Virginia, the crime of robbery is not defined by statute; instead, the
elements of robbery are taken from the common law. Common law defines
robbery as "the taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of
another, from his person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or
intimidation."8 To establish a robbery, each of these elements must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.9 In Branch v. Commonwealth,0 the
Supreme Court of Virginia identified the principal elements of a robbery as
(1) the taking, (2) the intent to steal, and (3) the use of violence or intimida-
tion."1 These three principal elements are further defined by their "temporal
correlation" to one another.'2 To constitute robbery at common law, the
taking must coincide with the intent to steal, the intent to steal must have
been formed before or during the violence, and the violence must occur
before or during the taking."
Like robbery, larceny is a common law crime in Virginia. It is defined
as "the wrongful or fraudulent taking of personal goods of some intrinsic
value, belonging to another, without his assent, and with the intention to
deprive the owner thereof permanently." 4 There are two actus elements
within common law larceny: (1) the caption, or taking of property, and (2)
the asportation, or the carrying away, of the property."5 The caption, or
taking, "must be the securing dominion or absolute control of the property.
The absolute dominion must exist at some time, though it be only rriomen-
tary."" To satisfy the asportation element of larceny, only the movement
6. See discussion infra Part M A.
7. See discussion infra Part I B, C.
8. Pierce v. Commonwealth, 138 S.E.2d 28, 31 (Va. 1964) (citing Mason v. Common-
wealth, 105 S.E.2d 149, 150 (Va. 1958)).
9. Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 183 S.E. 452, 454 (Va. 1936).
10. 300 S.E.2d 758 (Va. 1983).
11. Branch v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 758, 759 (Va. 1983).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Jones v. Commonwealth, 349 S.E.2d 414,418 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Dunlavey
v. Commonwealth, 35 S.E.2d 763, 764 (Va. 1945)).
15. Bryant v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Va. 1994).
16. Green v. Commonwealth, 112 S.E. 562, 563 (Va. 1922). In Green v. Common-
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of property from the location in which it was placed by the owner is re-
quired.17 For example, in Welch v. Commonwealth, " larceny was complete
when the shoplifter removed televisions from the shelf and put them in a
shopping cart which he abandoned in the outside lawn and garden area of
the store.19 In Bryant v. Commonwealth,20 larceny was complete when the
shoplifter took merchandise from the shelves and removed the packaging
and alarm sensors from the merchandise while still inside the store.21
B. Robbery Expands in the Context of Capital Cases
Both robbery and larceny involve the taking of property with the
intent to steal. Like larceny, "[t]he predicate element of robbery is the
actual taking by caption and asportation of the personal property of the
victim. " The critical difference between robbery and larceny is that
robbery involves violence or intimidation while larceny does not. It is the
violence or intimidation element that implies danger to the life of the victim
and makes robbery a proper predicate for both capital and first degree
felony murder. The substance of the taking elements of larceny, and there-
fore robbery, should not depend upon the crime charged, be it larceny,
robbery, first degree murder, or capital murder. However, the Virginia
courts have expanded the definition of robbery in the context of capital
cases by tinkering with the taking elements. The expansion of robbery by
the Virginia courts has transformed larceny into robbery in capital cases and
has given the Commonwealth yet another path to take in securing a sen-
tence of death.
1. Larceny Becomes Robbery in Capital Cases
On the night of January 18, 1958, Joseph Grimes was sitting in his
radio-television business. There were no lights on in the store. Around
midnight, Grimes noticed that a car kept driving past the store, and he
wealth, the victim's purse was moved away from her during an assault. There was no
evidence that the defendant ever had the purse within his control. When the purse was
recovered, its contents were undisturbed. The court found no caption and reversed the
defendant's robbery conviction. Id. at 563.
17. Welch v. Commonwealth, 425 S.E.2d 101, 104 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). See also
Durham v. Commonwealth, 198 S.E.2d 603 (Va. 1973). In Durham v. Commonwealth, the
Supreme Court of Virginia found movement of furniture sufficient to support the asportati-
on element of robbery. Even though there was no evidence that any property had been
removed from the house, the court affirmed Durham's first degree murder conviction, which
was predicated upon the robbery. Id. at 605-07.
18. 425 S.E.2d 101 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
19. Welch v. Commonwealth, 425 S.E.2d 101, 106 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
20. 445 S.E.2d 667 (Va. 1994).
21. Bryant v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Va. 1994).
22. Beard v. Commonwealth, 451 S.E.2d 698, 700 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
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became suspicious. Grimes notified the police and positioned himself
behind a display in the store. Shortly thereafter, William Paul Mason threw
a cement object through the plate glass window, entered the store, and took
a television set from the display area. As Mason handed the television
through the hole in the window to his companion, Grimes appeared from
behind the display and struck him with a board. Mason then threw a radio
at Grimes and fired four shots from a pistol in Grimes's general direction.23
Mason was convicted of robbery.24 On appeal, the court explained that "if
the violence or intimidation preceded or was concomitant with the taking,
the offense of robbery is established; if the taking was accomplished before
the violence toward or intimidation of Grimes, then it was not robbery."
2
Thus, "[n]o violence, no excitation of fear, resorted to merely for the
purpose of retaining a possession already acquired, or to effect escape, will,
in point of time, supply the element of force or intimidation, an essential
[element] of [robbery]."26 Applying that standard to the facts of the case, the
court found that, because the caption and asportation preceded the violence,
the evidence was insufficient to sustain Mason's robbery conviction.
In the capital context, the standard for robbery changes and larceny
becomes robbery. On September 24,1989, George A. Quesinberry and Eric
Hinkle broke into a warehouse. Quesinberry had with him a pistol. In one
office, Quesinberry found and took two walkie talkies. As the two men
were looking for money in another office within the warehouse, the owner
interrupted them. Once the owner realized that the men had a gun, he ran.
Quesinberry followed and shot him twice in the back. Afterwards,
Quesinberry returned to the office and took a box of money and a roll of
stamps before leaving the premises. Quesinberry was convicted of capital
murder based on the robbery predicate, and his sentence was fixed at
death." On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Quesinberry claimed
that the robbery predicate for capital murder was not established because the
taking of property from the warehouse was complete before Haynes was
23. Mason v. Commonwealth, 105 S.E.2d 149, 150 (Va. 1958).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 151.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 151-52. Mason could have been convicted of both larceny and assault, rather
than robbery. The difference is not the conduct; it is the sequence of events, or the temporal
connection. The purpose of the "temporal correlation" rule is to keep every larceny and
assault or battery from becoming robbery.
28. Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 218, 221 (Va. 1991).
29. Section 18.2-31(4) of the Virginia Code classifies as capital those killings that are
"[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of
robbery or attempted robbery." VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(4) (Michie 1999).
30. Quesinberry, 402 S.E.2d at 220.
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shot.31 Because the court found that "the robbery and killing of the victim
were interdependent objects of a common criminal design," the court
rejected Quesinberry's claim. 2 What the Supreme Court of Virginia meant
by "interdependent objects of a common criminal design" is not clear. To
the extent the capital murder conviction is based upon the taking of the
money and stamps, Quesinberry v. Commonwealth is probably correct; to
the extent it was based on the taking of the walkie-talkies, the decision
transformed larceny into robbery.
On January 22, 1993, Russell Tross and four friends entered a grocery
store in Harrisonburg, Virginia, to steel beer. Tross carried a gun in his
pocket. Two of Tross's companions took beer from the store and walked
out without paying. As Tross attempted to leave the store with a forty-
ounce bottle of beer in his pocket, Steven Daniel, the store manager, stepped
in front of the exit doors to block Tross's way. Tross raised his gun and
shot Daniel in the face.3 Tross, who was sixteen years old at the time of the
shooting, was convicted of capital murder under the robbery predicate of
the capital murder statute and sentenced to life imprisonment.34 Tross
claimed that because he took the beer before he came into contact with the
manager, the taking was complete before the shooting; therefore, there was
no robbery." The Virginia Court of Appeals upheld Tross's capital murder
conviction and found that the "asportation of the beer continued until he
shot the store manager in the face and took beer from the manager's domin-
ion and control." 6
The takings in Quesinberry (at least of the walkie-talkies) and Tross v.
Commonwealth were identical to that in Mason v. Commonwealth. In all
three cases, the caption and asportation preceded the violence. In Mason, a
non-capital case, the court reversed the defendant's robbery conviction
because the temporal connection between the taking and the violence had
not been established.3" In Quesinberry and Tross, both capital cases, the
courts found the evidence sufficient to support a capital murder conviction
based upon the robbery predicate. Yet, in both cases there was no tempo-
ral connection between the taking and the violence. How do takings that
look like larceny become sufficient to support a capital murder conviction?
The holdings in Welch and Bryant establish that larceny is complete when
31. Id. at 224.
32. Id.
33. Tross v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 523, 525-26 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
34. Id. at 525.
35. Id. at 534.
36. Id.
37. Mason, 105 S.E.2d at 152.
38. Quesinberny, 402 S.E.2d at 224; Tross, 464 S.E.2d at 534.
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a shoplifter removes an item from the display shelf.39 Under that standard,
the takings in Quesinberry and Tross clearly preceded the violence and could
therefore not constitute robbery or support capital murder convictions
based upon the robbery predicate. The holdings in Quesinberry and Tross
make clear that the Virginia courts are applying a different standard in the
context of capital murder. These holdings reveal that, when capital murder
is charged, larceny is not complete until the thief kills the proprietor to
retain the goods. Thus, in the capital context, larceny becomes robbery.
Mason involved a larceny plus assault/battery; if the proprietor had been
killed, the crime would have become a larceny plus criminal homicide,
probably second degree murder. Quesinberry and Tross transform the same
case into capital murder.
2. Afterthought Robbery Sufficientfor Capital Murder But Not
First Degree Murder?
On April 2, 1992, Michael V. Shepperson killed Victor White and took
his watch, necklace, wallet, car, rifle, and fifty dollars.' Shepperson was
charged with first degree murder,41 robbery, and use of a firearm in the
commission of a murder.42 During its deliberations, the jury submitted the
following question to the court: "If Michael Shepperson did not kill Victor
White with the intention of robbery can Michael Shepperson be found
guilty of robbery after the murder?"43 The court responded that "[i]n order
to find the defendant guilty you must find that the violence or intimidation
precede or be concomitant with the taking. It is immaterial that the victim
is dead when the theft occurs."" The jury returned with guilty verdicts on
all charges.4" On appeal, Shepperson challenged the court's answer to the
jury's question, arguing that it was both incorrect as a matter of law and not
responsive to the question asked." The Virginia Court of Appeals found
39. Welch, 425 S.E.2d at 104 (holding that "[t]he crime of larceny is complete when a
defendant with the requisite intent to permanently deprive takes possession of property
without the consent of the owner andmoves that property from the exact location it
occupied prior to the defendant's conduct"); Bryant, 445 S.E.2d 667, 670 (holding that "any
movement of the items, irrespective of how slight, is sufficient evidence of asportation").
40. Shepperson v. Commonwealth, 454 S.E.2d 5, 6 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
41. First' degree murder is defined by statute as "[m]urder, other than capital murder,
by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any willful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy,
inanimate or animate object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction... " VA.
CODE ANN. S 18.2-32 (Michie 1999).
42. Shepperson, 454 S.E.2d at 6.
43. Id. at 7.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 8.
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that while the answer supplied to the jury was technically correct, it was not
responsive to the question because the jury's question concerned the timing
of the intent to rob, not the timing of the violence or theft."7 The court
concluded that "[i]f Shepperson killed White only for a purpose unrelated
to theft, and as an afterthought decided to steal his property, the theft was
larceny;"4 since the trial court failed to give this information to the jury, the
court reversed Shepperson's robbery and first degree murder convictions.49
To support a capital murder conviction based upon the robbery predi-
cate, the Commonwealth must prove (1) that the defendant committed a
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder; and (2) that the murder was
committed "in the commission of a robbery."' ° First degree murder is
distinguishable from capital murder in that "the defendant found guilty of
first degree murder is the defendant who killed during the course of a
robbery, but did not kill with willfullness, deliberation, and premedita-
tion.""1 Capital murder is limited to those situations in which "both an
ongoing robbery.., and a premeditated murder are present simultaneously,
only where the defendant while engaged in the robbery . .. has killed
willfully, with premeditation, and with deliberation." 2 The difference
between capital murder and first degree murder is the defendant's mental
state; the elements of the underlying robbery should be the same. After
reading Shepperson, logic would dictate that if an afterthought larceny is
insufficient to support a first degree murder conviction, it would also be
insufficient to support a capital murder conviction based upon the robbery
predicate. The Virginia courts have held otherwise.5 3
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 8-9.
50. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(4) (Michie 1999).
51. Briley v. Bass, 584 F. Supp. 807, 839 (E.D. Va. 1984). The court's definition of first
degree murder in Briley is clearly correct. But see Orbe v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808,
813 (Va. 1999) (holding that "[a]n instruction on first degree murder was not warranted
because the video tape dearly established that [the victim] was shot in the chest during the
commission of armed robbery at the convenience store") (emphasis added). In Orbe v. Com-
monwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia misread the first degree. murder statute; an
instruction on first degree murder was not only warranted, it was required by the language
of the statute. See VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-32 (Michie 1999).
52. Briley, 584 F. Supp. at 839 (emphasis added). References to the former statutory
requirement which limited capital murder to robbery committed with the use of a deadly
weapon have been deleted.
53. See George v. Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d 12 (Va. 1991) (sustaining robbery capital
murder conviction upon evidence that the defendant took the victim's motorcycle and
helmet, hid them away from the body, and marked their location on a map); Williams v.
Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 361 (Va. 1987) (finding evidence that the defendant took three
dollars from the victim's wallet after the killing adequate to support a capital murder
conviction based on the robbery predicate offense).
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In Haskell v. Commonwealth, 4 the Supreme Court of Virginia estab-
lished the parameters of capital murder supported by the robbery
predicate."3 For the killing to be considered "in the commission of a
robbery," the killing must be so closely related in time, place, and causal
connection to the felony as to make them part of the "same criminal
enterprise."' However, in George v. Commonwealth, 7 the court expanded
the rule to include "a killing which takes place before, during, or after the
robbery;" 8 in doing so, the court explicitly endorsed afterthought robbery
in the capital context despite its rejection of afterthought robbery in the first
degree murder context. The same might be said of the post-homicide taking
of the stamps and money in Quesinberry. The Virginia courts are thus
making it easier for the Commonwealth to indict and convict for capital




Rape is defined by the Virginia Code as "sexual intercourse... against
the complaining witness's will, by force, threat or intimidation." 9 Early
rape cases required the Commonwealth to prove sexual intercourse by
evidence "that there ha[d] been an actual penetration to some extent of the
male sexual organ into the female sexual organ."' In McCall v. Common-
wealth,61 the only proof of penetration presented by the Commonwealth
was injury to the girl's genital organs; the Supreme Court of Virginia
determined there was no proof that the injury was caused by the defendant's
penetration and required that the "proof must go beyond the mere showing
of injury to the genital organs of the female and an opportunity on the part
of the accused to have committed the offense."6' Likewise, in Strawderman
v. Commonwealth,' testimony by a physician that the injury to the genital
area was caused by a male penis was held by the court to be insufficient to
54. 243 S.E.2d 477 (Va. 1978).
55. Haskell v. Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 477, 483 (Va. 1978).
56. Id.
57. 411 S.E.2d 12 (Va. 1991).
58. George v. Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d 12, 20 (Va. 1991) (emphasis added).
59. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-61(A) (Michie 1999).
60. McCall v. Commonwealth, 65 S.E.2d 540, 542 (Va. 1951). See also Strawderman v.
Commonwealth, 108 S.E.2d 376, 379 (Va. 1959).
61. 65 S.E.2d 540 (Va. 1951).
62. Id. at 542. The victim's family physician testified that he could not determine the
cause of the injury. Id.
63. Id.
64. 108 S.E.2d 376 (Va. 1959).
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establish sexual intercourse. 6 The court explained that the doctor's testi-
mony overlooked the possibility that the injuries could have been caused by
other means.6
2. The Scope of Rape Expands in Tuggle v. Commonwealth
While early rape cases like McCall and Strawderman established a high
standard for proof of penetration, that standard has been lowered by the
Virginia courts through expansion of the evidence that courts accept to
prove penetration. In large part, the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision
in Tuggle v. Commonwealth6' was the impetus for the change. Tuggle was
convicted of capital murder under the rape predicate" of the capital murder
statute.6 1 On appeal, Tuggle claimed that the Commonwealth failed to
prove capital murder based on the rape predicate because (1) the evidence
did not establish that he penetrated the victim's vagina with his penis and
(2) the evidence did not establish that sexual intercourse was forced upon the
victim against her will.'0 Evidence introduced by the Commonwealth
included testimony by the medical examiner that "something" penetrated
the victim's vagina; "[t]ests established that semen was found in the victim's
rectum, indicating penetration and ejaculation there, but sperm was not
found in her vagina.""' In challenging the proof of the rape, Tuggle relied
upon McCall and Strawderman.2 The court found McCall and Strawderman
distinguishable from the facts before them because there was no indication
in either of those cases that the defendant had exposed his penisz3 In Tuggle,
on the other hand, the court found the presence of semen in the victim's
rectum sufficient to establish penile exposure. 4 By holding the combination
of vaginal injury and penile exposure sufficient to establish penetration, the
court allowed the Commonwealth to prove vaginal rape with evidence of
anal sodomy. The strict proof requirements of McCall and Strawderman
were discarded.
In Tuggle, the Supreme Court of Virginia expanded rape in the capital
context; in Elam v. Commonwealth"5 the court extended the expansion to
rape cases. Elam was convicted of rape; on appeal, he claimed that the
65. Strawderman v. Commonwealth, 108 S.E.2d 376, 379-80 (Va. 1959).
66. Id. at 380.
67. 323 S.E.2d 539 (Va. 1984).
68. See VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(5) (Michie 1999).
69. Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 539, 543 (Va. 1984).




74. Id. at 550.
75. 326 S.E.2d 685 (Va. 1985).
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Commonwealth failed to prove penetration. 76 In support of his claim that
penetration never occurred, Elam relied upon an excerpt from the victim's
testimony which read as follows:
Q. All right, after he jerked off your clothes, what did he do?
A. Well, he didn't rape me; I don't think he raped me; but it seemed like
they thought he did.
Q. Did he try to put his penis into your sexual organ?
A. Yes.
Q. But you don't know whether he got it in or not?
A. No, I don't, but it liked to scared me to death."
The court dismissed the victim's testimony that penetration never occurred
by explaining that the meaning of rape to the lay person differs from that
assigned to it by the law." Although the victim's testimony standing alone
was insufficient to establish rape, the court found that, taken together,
circumstantial evidence consisting of vaginal injury and semen found on a
blanket was sufficient to establish penetration.79 Although there was no
semen found in or around the victim's vagina, the court found the presence
of semen on a blanket sufficient to establish proof of penile exposure.80
After Elam, the standard of proof for rape set in the capital context by
Tuggle-vaginal injury plus penile exposure-was extended to rape cases.
81
B. Forcible Sodomy
1. Forcible Sodomy Defined
The Virginia Code defines forcible sodomy as "cunnilingus, fellatio,
anallingus, or anal intercourse ... accomplished against the will of the
complaining witness." 2 Labeling the offense as "forcible" sodomy "is
slightly misleading because actual force is not required... it is the willing-
76. Elani v. Commonwealth, 326 S.E.2d 685, 686 (Va. 1985).
77. Id.
78. Id. Citing Tuggle, the court reaffirmed the legal principles defining rape as follows:
Penetration by a penis of a vagina is an essential element of the crime of rape-
proof of penetration, however sli ht the entry may be, is sufficient; evidence of
ejaculation is not required; and noliypothesis that penetration was accomplished
by some object other than the penis is sufficient to reverse a conviction unless it
reasonably flows from the evidence itself rather than the imagination of counsel.
Id. at 686-87 (citing Tuggle, 323 S.E.2d 539).
79. Id. at 687.
80. Id.
81. See Morrison v. Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 612, 613 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that absence of victim testimony indicating that penetration occurred was not dispositive in
light of medical examination which found vaginal injury and circumstantial evidence of
penile exposure). But see Moore v. Commonwealth, 491 S.E.2d 739, 742 (Va. 1997) (finding
no evidence of penetration because, when victim testified that defendant put his penis on her
vagina, it was clear from the evidence that she was referring to the external area of her body).
82. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-67.1(A) (Michie 1999).
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ness of the victim which is crucial.""3 As in rape, actual penetration is
required. 4 In Ryan v. Commonwealth,"5 the Supreme Court of Virginia,
relying upon testimony by the victim that the defendant had licked her
vagina,86 found circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove penetration by
the defendant's mouth."' The assault spanned a period of approximately
forty-five minutes, during which time the defendant "rubbed his penis
around [victim's] vaginal area, fondled her breasts and took his tongue and
.. started down around the vagia with his tongue, licking her vagina."88
Ryan states that a conviction of sodomy by cunnilingus requires penetra-
tion, but, as in rape cases, the penetration need only be slight and can be
proved by circumstantial evidence."
2. Technical Redefinition of Penetration Expands Forcible Sodomy
Ryan made it clear that a sodomy conviction requiredproof of penetra-
tion. Later cases further defined what portions of the female anatomy must
be penetrated to support a conviction of sodomy by cunnilingus. In Love
v. Commonwealth,' the Virginia Court of Appeals addressed the anatomy
issue and concluded that penetration of the labia majora, the outer lips of
the vagina, was enough to support a conviction of sodomy by cunnilingus;
penetration into the opening of the vagina was not required. In Horton &
Newby v. Commonwealth, 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the
anatomy issue in even greater detail. 3 Because section 18.2-67.1 of the
Virginia Code does not define cunnilingus, the court relied upon the tradi-
tional meaning of the word as encompassing "stimulation of the vulva or
clitoris with the lips or tongue."'4 The court then examined the female
83. ROGER D. GROOT, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN VIRGINIA 429 (4th ed.
1998).
84. See Hudson v. Commonwealth, 127 S.E. 89 (Va. 1925) (holding that penetration is
an essential element of sodomy); Ashby v. Commonwealth, 158 S.E.2d 657, 658 (Va. 1968)
(holding evidence that a boy placed his mouth on a man's genitals insufficient to establish the
essential element of penetration).
85. 247 S.E.2d 698 (Va. 1978).
86. Ryan v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 698, 700 (Va. 1978).
87. Id. at 702.
88. Id. at 700-01.
89. Id. at 702.
90. 441 S.E.2d 709 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
91. Love v. Commonwealth, 441 S.E.2d 709, 712 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
92. 499 S.E.2d 258 (Va. 1998).
93. Horton & Newby v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 258, 261-62 (Va. 1998).
94. Id. at 261 (quoting WEBSTER'STHIRDNEWINTERNATIONALDICTIONARY 554 (3d
ed. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 380 (6th




anatomy to determine which portions of the female genitalia must be
penetrated to constitute cunnilingus. The court concluded that "[s]ince
cunnilingus involves stimulation of the vulva or clitoris and the vulva
encompasses the outermost part of the female genitalia, we conclude that
penetration of any portion of the vulva is sufficient to prove sodomy by
cunnilingus."" In Love, the Virginia Court of Appeals recognized that
other jurisdictions had held that "insertion of the defendant's tongue into
the victim's vagina need not be shown to prove cunnilingus."% In Horton
& Newby, the Supreme Court of Virginia explicitly adopted that standard.97
The court applied its technical redefinition of penetration to the facts of the
cases before it and affirmed the convictions of both Horton, who licked his
victim's vagina, and Newby, who "drooled" on his victim's vagina.9" Thus,
the court accepted external conduct as an inference of internal penetration.
One has to stretch the imagination to visualize an instance in which the
proof requirements for penetration set by the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Horton & Newby would not be satisfied.
On March 30, 1992, the body of seventeen-year-old Timothy Jason
Hall was found near an abandoned construction building."' Walter
Mickens, Jr. was convicted of Hall's murder based on the attempted forcible
sodomy predicate"° of the capital murder statute."' Hall's nude body was
discovered lying face down on a mattress with his legs spread approximately
twelve inches apart; in addition white lubricant was found around his
anus."02 African-American pubic hairs taken from Hall's buttocks matched
the sample taken from Mickens, an African-American.0 3 There were also
bloody "transfer" stains found on Hall's thighs and DNA extracted from
semen found on the mattress was consistent with Mickens's DNA.104 The
court concluded that, taken together, the circumstantial evidence established
proof of attempted forcible sodomy."0 '
Because the Commonwealth in Mickens relied on the attempted forcible
sodomy predicate, evidence of penetration was not required. Mickens, of
95. Horton & Newby, 499 S.E.2d at 261-62.
96. Love, 441 S.E.2d at 712.
97. Horton & Newby, 499 S.E.2d at 262.
98. Id.
99. Mickens v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 678, 681 (Va. 1994).
100. See VA. CODE ANN. 5 18.2-31(5) (Michie 1999).
101. Mickens, 442 S.E.2d at 681.
102. Id. at 688.
103. Id. Human tissue was attached to the pubic hairs found on Hall. The attached
tissue suggested that the hairs were forcibly removed. The court found this "consistent with
Mickens' having rubbed his genitals against Hall's buttocks." Id.
104. Id. Transfer stains "occur when an object comes into contact with blood and then
contacts another surface, thereby leaving a stain on the other surface." Id. at 681 n.1.
105. Id. at 688.
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course, involved sodomy by anal intercourse rather than by cunnilingus.
After the redefinition of penetration in the context of forcible sodomy by
cunnilingus in Horton & Newby,"°6 the circumstantial evidence tending to
show proof of penetration in Mickens would likely now fall within the
parameters of forcible sodomy. Even if that is not the case, the rape cases
would produce the same result. In Tuggle and Elam, vaginal injury plus
penile exposure satisfied the penetration element of rape ." It is clear from
the current trend that the expansion of penetration in the rape context is
easily transferrable to the forcible sodomy context. The pubic hairs, human
tissue, and bloody transfer stains in Mickens are equivalent to the vaginal
injury in Tuggle and Elam, and penile exposure is proven by the presence of
semen on the mattress. The Commonwealth's decision to charge capital
murder based upon the attempted forcible sodomy predicate rather than the
forcible sodomy predicate could be explained by the fact that the Virginia
courts' expansion of penetration had not been explicitly adopted in the
context of forcible sodomy by anal intercourse. Reading Tuggle, Elam, and
Love together, two general principles emerge: in the context of sex crimes,
the level of penetration required by the courts is (1) slender, and (2) proven
by the vaginal injury plus penile exposure, or its equivalent. Adding Horton
& Newby to these general principles indicates that, although not yet explic-
itly adopted, the court's expansion of penetration in the context of forcible
sodomy by cunnilingus has probably expanded into the context of forcible
sodomy by anal intercourse. In any event, the foundation has been laid for
the court's expansion of penetration in the context of forcible sodomy. If
the trend established by capital cases predicated upon robbery and rape
continues, then it is only a matter of time before the bar is further lowered
in capital cases predicated upon forcible sodomy.
C. Object Sexual Penetration
1. Object Sexual Penetration Defined
The Virginia Code defines object sexual penetration ("OSP") as the
inanimate or animate object sexual penetration of the labia majora or anus
with any object or animal by force, threat, or intimidation.0" Initially, the
OSP statute only included inanimate object penetration; animate object
penetration was added in 1993. °9 Thus, the OSP statute has itself expanded.
In Bell v. Commonwealtb,"0 the Virginia Court of Appeals addressed the
question of what objects fell within the meaning of "animate" under the
106. Horton & Newby was decided in 1998, four years after Mickens.
107. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
108. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-67.2(A) (Mchie 1999).
109. 1993 Va. Acts, ch. 549.
110. 468 S.E.2d 114 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
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OSP statute."' The defendant in Bell challenged his conviction of animate
OSP on the basis that his finger did not fall within the definition of an
"animate" object."' Recognizing the ambiguity of the statute, the court
looked to the definition of "animate" and the plain meaning of the statute
for clarification."' Finding that "animate" means "possessing life; living,"
the court concluded that a finger fell within that definition. "4 Furthermore,
the court explained that the Commonwealth was not required to label the
object used for penetration as animate or inanimate because the statute
covered "any object."' Bell represents the beginning of a trend of broad
interpretation by the Virginia Court of Appeals of OSP proof requirements.
2. Technical Redefinition of Penetration Extended to
Object Sexual Penetration
InJett v. Commonwealth, "6 the Virginia Court of Appeals addressed the
penetration requirements of OSP. The court concluded that, as in rape and
forcible sodomy, penetration in the context of OSP "need only be slight."" 7
The court's qualification of the penetration requirements of OSP seems
unwarranted since section 18.2-67.2 of the Virginia Code clearly states that
penetration in the OSP context involves the penetration of "the labia majora
or anus . . . with any object.""' In Jett, the victim's testimony did not
establish penetration, but the court found circumstantial evidence of
victim's vaginal pain and swollen clitoris sufficient to establish penetra-
tion."9 In holding the victim's vaginal pain and swollen clitoris to be
sufficient evidence of OSP, the court appears to permit proof of injury alone
to serve as evidence of penetration. It is not clear that there is an equivalent
to the penile exposure evidence required in rape cases. In Jett, evidence
111. See also Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999). Because Payne
inserted his finger into the victim's vagina, he was convicted of capital murder based upon
the OSP predicate. Id. at 298-99.
112. Bell v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 114, 116 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). The defendant
contended that "animate" only referred to acts done by or with an animal. The court noted
that section 18.2-67.2 specifically addressed acts committed by or with an animal separately;
thus, animate was not limited to penetration by or with an animal. Id. at 117.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIoNARY 111 (2d College ed. 1982)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. 501 S.E.2d 457 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
117. Jett v. Commonwealth, 501 S.E.2d 457,459 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Horton
& Newby v. Commonwealth, 449 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Va. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
118. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-67.2(A) (Michie 1999) (emphasis added).
119. Jett, 501 S.E.2d at 459.
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indicated the use of both a doll and a hairbrush, but the victim's testimony
referred to these objects "on the outside of [her] pookie."20
3. Attempted Object Sexual Penetration in the First Degree Murder Context
In Marshall v. Commonwealth,' the defendant was charged with the
murder of his infant son and convicted of first degree felony murder based
upon the attempted OSP predicate." The doctor who performed the
autopsy testified that the infant died from "severe blunt force trauma to the
abdomen."' The doctor also found abrasions around the infant's anus and
testified that the injuries on the anal ring were unrelated to the abdominal
injuries but "could have been caused by a human finger." "" On cross-
examination, the doctor admitted that "a rough towel in conjunction with
a finger" pushed up or against the anus could have caused the abrasions. 2
There was no specific evidence of penetration. 126 Marshall's convictions
were affirmed."?
If Marshall had been charged with completed OSP rather than at-
tempted OSP the Commonwealth could have charged either first degree
felony murder or capital murder.' Would the Jett rule, which reduces
proof of penetration to injury alone, now be sufficient to support a charge
of first degree felony murder or capital murder predicated upon OSP? In
Jett, the Tuggle and Elam redefinition of penetration-vaginal injury plus
penile exposure (identification of the offending object?)-is put into the OSP
context. In holding that "evidence of the victim's pain and swollen clitoris
established the element of penetration,"' the court in Jett apparently
reduced the proof of penetration to mere injury. At a minimum, proof of
injury plus proof of an available object appears sufficient. The expansion
of penetration in Jett may go beyond both Tuggle and Elam. If the proof of
penetration is the injury alone, there is no equivalent to penile exposure. In
the OSP context, it does not matter in which orifice the injury appears and
there is some question as to whether the object used even has to be identi-
120. Id. The victim testified that the defendant showed her how to rub a hairbrush or
Barbie doll "on the outside of [her] pookie." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. 496 S.E.2d 120 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
122. Marshall v. Commonwealth, 496 S.E.2d 120, 122 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. The anal injuries were found to be of the same age as the abdominal injuries.
Id. at 123.
125. Id. at 122. At the time, the first degree felony murder statute only included
inanimate OSP; animate OSP was added in 1998, see 1998 Va. Acts, ch. 281, but Marshall
failed to preserve that issue for review.
126. Marshall, 496 S.E.2d at 122-23.
127. Id. at 125.
128. Attempted OSP is not currently included within the capital murder statute.
129. Jett, 501 S.E.2d at 459.
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fled by the Commonwealth. If there is no duty to identify the object used
to carry out the OSP and the Jett penetration standard continues to be
followed by the Virginia courts, there may be no remaining distinction
between attempted and completed OSP.
D. The Future of Attempted Sex Crimes
The proof of penetration has been reduced such that there is little, if
any, distinction remaining between attempted and completed sex crimes,
especially in the OSP context. After Tuggle, Elam, Horton & Newby, and
Jett, the conclusion is both obvious and shocking: injury alone may be
sufficient to prove penetration in all sex crimes. This is extraordinarily
dangerous because it abolishes the distinction between attempted and
completed sex crimes across the board. Erasing the distinctions between
attempted and completed sex crimes has serious consequences for those
charged with these crimes.130 It also, in effect, expands the capital murder
statute by including what is properly attempted OSP under section 18.2-
31(5) as completed OSP.
V. Conclusion
In the beginning there was robbery. Then there was capital murder
based upon the robbery predicate. The concept of robbery expanded in the
context of capital cases, but the expansion did not carry over to plain
robbery cases or first degree murder/robbery cases. Thus, we end up with
two different standards: one for plain robbery and first degree
murder/robbery and another for capital murder predicated upon robbery.
In the capital context, larceny becomes robbery and an afterthought larceny
is sufficient to support a capital murder conviction. Thus, the standard
employed in the capital murder/robbery context is more expansive than
that employed in the robbery or first degree/robbery context.
The expansion of traditional felonies in the context of sex offenses took
a different turn than the expansion in the robbery context. In the context
of sex offenses, Tuggle v. Commonwealth, a capital murder case based upon
130. Section 18.2-26 of the Virginia Code lays out the penalty structure for attempts to
commit noncapital felonies. Under 18.2-26, if the maximum penalty available for the felony
attempted is life imprisonment or more than twenty years, the attempt is punishable as a
Class 4 felony; if the maximum penalty for the felony is twenty years, the attempt is punish-
able as a Class 5 felony; and if the maximum penalty for the felony is less than twenty years,
the attempt is punishable as a Class 6 felony. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-26 (Michie 1999).
Section 18.2-67.5 of the Virginia Code establishes the penalty for attempted rape, forcible
sodomy, and inanimate or animate object sexual penetration; these attempts are punishable
as Class 4 felonies. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-67.5 (Michie 1999). Under this penalty structure,
attempted OSP is a Class 4 felony which carries a penalty of two to ten years. Id. If the
distinction between attempted OSP and completed OSP has been lost, the penalty is five
years to life. VA. CODE ANN. 5 18.2-67.2 (Michie 1999).
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the rape predicate, expanded rape. The expansion was followed in Elam v.
Commonwealth, a pure rape case. Tuggle also precipitated the expansion of
forcible sodomy and OSP. In Tuggle, rape was redefined in the context of
capital murder and the expansion then carried over to forcible sodomy and
OSP. The difference is that expansion of robbery within the capital context
did not extend to plain robbery. Thus, we are operating under two different
standards in the robbery and capital murder/robbery context but are not
operating under two different standards in the rape and capital murder/rape
context. Instead, both rape in the non-capital context and rape in the capital
murder context have been expanded.
Rape, forcible sodomy, and OSP each require proof of penetration.
The requirement of penetration remains, but what evidence is necessary to
prove penetration changes. The technical redefinition of what suffices as
penetration in Horton & Newby v. Commonwealth significantly lowers and
ossibly eliminates the requirement of penetration, at least in the context of
orcible sodomy by cunnilingus. The expansion has not been explicitly
adopted in the capital context based on the forcible sodomy predicate;
however, in Jett, it did carry over to the OSP context. This establishes a
dangerous trend and could have a serious impact on capital cases based on
rape, sodomy, and OSP.
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